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Abstract—This paper firstly considers the research problem of fairness in collaborative deep learning, while ensuring privacy. A novel
reputation system is proposed through digital tokens and local credibility to ensure fairness, in combination with differential privacy to
guarantee privacy. In particular, we build a fair and differentially private decentralised deep learning framework called FDPDDL, which
enables parties to derive more accurate local models in a fair and private manner by using our developed two-stage scheme: during the
initialisation stage, artificial samples generated by Differentially Private Generative Adversarial Network (DPGAN) are used to mutually
benchmark the local credibility of each party and generate initial tokens; during the update stage, Differentially Private SGD (DPSGD) is
used to facilitate collaborative privacy-preserving deep learning, and local credibility and tokens of each party are updated according to
the quality and quantity of individually released gradients. Experimental results on benchmark datasets under three realistic settings
demonstrate that FDPDDL achieves high fairness, yields comparable accuracy to the centralised and distributed frameworks, and delivers
better accuracy than the standalone framework.
Index Terms—Decentralised deep learning; Fairness; Credibility; Privacy.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
IN real world, many practical applications would benefitfrom large-scale deep learning across sensitive datasets
owned by different parties, thus data sharing and analysis
across parties are of paramount importance to accelerate
scientific discovery, facilitate quality improvement initiatives,
speed up hypothesis testing, and boost accuracy towards
higher level, especially when there are not enough local
examples to test a hypothesis [1]. This trend is motivated by
the fact that the data from a single organization may be very
homogeneous, ending up with an unsatisfactory model that
fails to generalise to other data, as shown in Fig. 1a. Therefore,
there is much demand to train a global model by a central
server on the combined data collected from independent
parties to ensure sufficient statistical power to test hypotheses
(Fig. 1b). On the other hand, deep learning can be performed
in a collaborative manner, where a parameter server is
required to maintain the latest parameters available to all
parties (Fig. 1c). However, such central server-based learning
framework suffers from the following weaknesses:
• Untrusted server. Due to privacy issue, a party may not
trust a central server [2], thus reluctant to transfer either
data or model parameters to the server.
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• Single-point-of-failure. Once the central server is shut
down, the whole network stops working. Moreover, if
the central server is attacked, the entire network is under
the risk of being compromised [2].
• Malicious attack. The data being disseminated is muta-
ble. An attacker could arbitrarily change its local model
without being detected, and no audit trail is available to
identify such malicious behaviour.
• Lack of fairness and vulnerable to free-riders: Existing
frameworks consider that all parties contribute equally.
This is typically impractical due to the data quality and
quantity of each party. It is thus unfair that at the end
of the collaboration, all parties get access to the same
global model regardless of their contributions. In an
extreme case, even the free-riders could successfully join
the system, and enjoy the system’s global model for
free. The lack of fairness might discourage collaboration
among parties.
To address the first two issues, we make use of Blockchain
to provide a fully decentralised framework, i.e., each partici-
pant does not trust any third party or any other participants,
as illustrated in Fig. 1d. In particular, we explicitly study two
types of malicious parties, including free-rider without any
data and the GAN attacker. We claim these two malicious parties
considered all belong to the category of “non-credible” parties, but
not all “non-credible” parties are malicious, a “non-credible”
party might follow the protocol honestly, but may have
limited data or totally different data distribution from the
majority party, thus it is still reasonable for all the other
parties to give low local credibility to this “non-credible”
party, or even isolate it.
However, the last two issues are yet to be solved, and
collaboration might be significantly hindered due to privacy
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(a) Standalone. (b) Centralised. (c) Distributed. (d) Decentralised.
Fig. 1: Different deep learning frameworks.
and confidentiality restrictions. To overcome these problems,
we are inspired to develop a decentralised collaborative
learning framework that respects collaborative fairness, data
privacy and utility at the same time, so as to encourage
more parties to collaborate. Our main contributions are
summarised as follows:
• We initiate the research problem of collaborative fairness
in collaborative learning, and propose a fair and private
framework, named Fair and Differentially Private De-
centralised Deep Learning (FDPDDL).
• To address fairness and privacy problem, we propose a
two-stage scheme, which is realised by two algorithms
respectively, i.e., i) local credibility and tokens initial-
isation, and ii) local credibility and tokens update. In
particular, we build a novel reputation system, which
reflects the relative contribution of each party, thus
ensuring fairness; we use Differentially Private GAN
(DPGAN) in the initialisation stage and Differentially
Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DPSGD) in the update
stage to mitigate privacy leakage;
• Our framework provides a viable solution to detect and
isolate free-riders and GAN attacker both before and
during the collaborative learning process;
• We evaluate our framework on several benchmark
datasets under three realistic settings. Extensive experi-
ments demonstrate that FDPDDL achieves high fairness,
delivers comparable accuracy to the centralised and
distributed deep learning frameworks, and outperforms
the standalone deep learning framework, confirming the
superiority of FDPDDL.
2 RELATED WORK AND PRELIMINARIES
This section firstly reviews the relevant deep learning frame-
works, and the privacy and fairness issues in deep learning.
Secondly, the relevant techniques used in this paper are
introduced, including differential privacy and Blockchain.
2.1 Deep Learning Frameworks
In general, deep learning frameworks fall into the following
four categories:
Standalone deep learning: participants individually train
standalone models on their training data without any collab-
oration, as shown in Fig. 1a.
Centralised deep learning: Centralised deep learning
forces multiple participants to pool their data into a cen-
tralised server to train a global model on the combined data,
as depicted in Fig. 1b.
Distributed deep learning: Shokri et al. [3] firstly intro-
duced the concept of Distributed Selective Stochastic Gradient
Descent (DSSGD) for distributed deep learning. It allows each
party to keep local model private while iteratively update
its model by integrating differentially private gradients from
other parties via a parameter server, as illustrated in Fig. 1c.
The communication cost, within each round of parameter
update, is addressed by only sharing a fraction (e.g., 1%-10%)
of local model gradients that have values larger than a certain
threshold or those gradients with the largest absolute values.
Federated learning is a special case of distributed deep
learning, which is tailored to deal with Non-IID, unbalanced
and massively distributed data in mobile application [4], [5],
[6]. The goal is to train a shared global model while leaving
training data on users’ mobile phones. Mobile phones with
relatively powerful and fast processors (including GPUs) are
required to download the current model, compute updates by
performing local computation, then send local model updates
to the trusted Google Cloud server in each communication
round.
Decentralised deep learning: Decentralised framework is
much different than server-based framework, in the sense
that it is purely decentralised without relying on any central
servers, as exemplified in Fig. 1d. The first decentralised
machine learning model is ModelChain [7], which applies
Blockchain technology to machine learning by incorporating
the idea of boosting, i.e., samples that are more difficult to
classify are more likely to improve the model significantly.
The follow-up work [8], [9], [10] integrated blockchain into
deep learning. For example, Kang et al. [10] proposed an
effective incentive mechanism to motivate high-reputation
mobile devices with high-quality data to participate in model
learning, but they overlooked the privacy issues.
It should be noted that in both distributed framework and
decentralised framework, parties are all involved in the iter-
ative process of building a global or consensus model, hence
we call them collaborative deep learning frameworks. A succinct
comparison among different deep learning frameworks is
provided in Table 1.
2.2 Privacy-preserving Deep Learning
Privacy-preserving Centralised deep learning: Centralised
model is very effective, however it is not privacy-preserving
since the central server has direct access to all sensitive
information. Shokri et al. [3] pointed out that centralised
deep learning poses serious privacy threats, including (i) all
the sensitive training data are exposed to a susceptible third
party who can permanently keep the collected data; (ii) data
owners have no control over the learning objective or the
knowledge of what can be inferred from their data; (iii) the
learned model is not directly available to data owners.
Privacy-preserving Distributed deep learning: Dis-
tributed deep learning generally suffers from the common
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TABLE 1: Feature comparison of different deep learning frameworks.
Deep learning frameworks Standalone Centralised Distributed [3], [4], [11] Decentralised [7] Decentralised (ours)
Architecture Fig. 1a Fig. 1b Fig. 1c Fig. 1d Fig. 1d
Global/Consensus model No Yes Yes Yes No
Local models Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Fairness NA NA No No Yes
“non-credible” party detection NA No No No Yes
issue of privacy leakage from the shared gradients. As
demonstrated in [12], even a small proportion of local
gradients can reveal certain amount of local data information.
In the case of a local network with only one neuron, the server
can extract local data with non-negligible probability. Even
for complex neural networks trained with regularisation, the
gradients can still expose certain label information of local
data [12]. Moreover, if a party turns out to be malicious, it can
easily sabotage the learning process (e.g., by spoofing random
data samples) or violate some of the privacy requirements by
inferring information about the victim party’s private data,
which the attacker is not supposed to know. Hitaj et al. [13]
devised an active inference attack on deep neural networks
in a collaborative setting, which is referred to as Generative
Adversarial Networks (GAN) attack. It exploits the real-time
nature of the learning process that allows the adversarial
party to train a GAN that generates prototypical samples
of the targeted training data that was meant to be private
and the generated samples are intended to come from the
same distribution as the training data. The malicious party
is able to attack other parties successfully as long as the
global model is under the process of learning. GAN attack
makes the distributed setting even more undesirable, as
in centralised learning only the server may pose privacy
threat, but in distributed learning, any party can violate the
privacy of any other parties in the system, even without
involving the server [13]. It is worth noting that GAN attack
succeeds only if the following three conditions are held: (i)
the adversary has knowledge of labels of the victim party;
(ii) class distributions of the adversary and the victim party
are non-independent and identically distributed (Non-IID);
(iii) the victim party is not secured by any privacy protection
mechanism or it adopts per-parameter privacy in DSSGD
which results in meaningless privacy.
To tackle with privacy issue, secure multiparty compu-
tation (SMC) has been used to build privacy-preserving
neural networks in a distributed manner. For example, Se-
cureML [11] allows clients to distribute their private training
data among two non-colluding servers during the setup
phase; these two servers then employ SMC to train a global
model on the clients’ encrypted joint data. In general, SMC
techniques achieve a high level of privacy and accuracy, at the
expense of high computational and communication overhead
for participants, thereby doing a disservice to attracting
participation. Alternatively, Shokri et al. [3] perturbed the
shared local model gradients by adding noise to satisfy
differential privacy. However, their privacy bounds are given
per-parameter, the large number of parameters prevents the
technique from providing a meaningful privacy guarantee.
In federated learning, to protect individual model updates
from the adversarial server who might scrutinize individual
updates, instead of using differential privacy as in [3],
Bonawitz et al. [5] proposed a secure and failure-robust
protocol based on SMC to securely aggregate local model
updates as the weighted average to update the global
model on the server. Another more efficient method is to
borrow differential privacy to conceal user participation, as
demonstrated by McMahan et al. [6]. However, it requires a
large number of users (on the order of thousands) to ensure
model convergence and an acceptable trade-off between
privacy and utility. Moreover, the default trusted Google
server is entitled to see all users’ updates in the clear,
aggregate these updates and add noise to the aggregation,
hence their scheme is even weaker than DSSGD when the
server is untrusted.
Overall, all the current distributed deep learning frame-
works need to be coordinated by a central server, thus falling
under the umbrella of server-based frameworks.
Privacy-preserving Decentralised deep learning: The first
decentralised machine learning model, i.e., ModelChain,
stated that privacy is preserved by exchanging zero patient
data, however, the exchanged model-level information can
still largely leak local data information [12]. Furthermore,
the proposed logic for ModelChain is reasonable only if
all the participants are honest. More recently, Kim et al. [9]
proposed blockchain-based privacy preserving deep learning
and utilized a consensus mechanism to verify local model
updates. Zhu et al. [8] provided a proof-of-concept for
managing security issues in federated learning systems
via blockchain technology. However, none of these works
considered the fairness problem in collaborative learning.
2.3 Fairness in Collaborative Deep Learning
There has been a long line of work studying fairness in
machine learning, however, to the best of our knowledge,
existing research on fairness mostly focuses on the protection
of some specific attributes, or aim to reduce the variance
of the accuracy distribution across participants [14], [15],
while none of the previous works addressed the problem of
collaborative fairness in collaborative learning.
Overall, all the current collaborative deep learning frame-
works focus on how to learn a global model or consensus
model with higher accuracy than standalone models, while
losing the ability to verify the contribution of individual
participant, because participants can access the same global
model or consensus model no matter how differently they
contribute. In extreme cases, there may exist free-riders
in the collaborative learning system, who aim to benefit
from the global model, but do not want to contribute any
real information. For clarity, we give a concrete example in
Example. 2.1 to showcase how a free-rider party C (no data
or model in particular) can also obtain the global model even
if it fails to make any practical contributions to the global
learning process.
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Example 2.1. Suppose that three parties A, B, and C are involved
in server-based deep learning:
• A (honest) has data DA and Model MA with accuracy 90%.
• B (honest) has data DB and Model MB with accuracy 80%.
• C (free-rider) has no data or model to start with.
Suppose that whenever it is C’s turn to upload the gradients,
it always uploads random or carefully crafted gradients, so that
the global learning process will not be affected. Finally, all three
participants have access to the same global model.
This lack-of-fairness is an essential problem that persists in
all the existing collaborative learning frameworks but has been
overlooked by far. Lack of fairness can be an obstacle for
widespread the adoption of collaborative learning as a new
type of powerful learning platform. On the other hand, this
fairness issue can be addressed by swinging existing learning
frameworks to the other extreme that openly publishes all the
gradients. In that case, fairness might be achieved but at the
cost of privacy, which is highly undesirable in collaborative
deep learning.
2.4 Differential Privacy
Definition 1. A randomised algorithm A satisfies (, δ)-
approximate Differential Privacy (DP) if
Pr{A(D1) ∈ S} ≤ e Pr{A(D2) ∈ S}+ δ , (1)
for all set S ⊆ range(A), and all pairs of datasets D1, D2, where
D1 can be obtained from D2 by adding or removing one tuple.
Further, if δ = 0, we say A preserves -differential privacy.
Unlike the previous empirical criterion for privacy [16],
differential privacy is based on a solid theoretical founda-
tion [17]. The formal definition of DP has two parameters:
i) privacy budget  measures the incurred privacy leakage –
lower  means less information leakage and higher privacy
guarantee; ii) δ bounds the probability that the privacy loss
exceeds , with the recommended value δ  1/N , where
N is the number of training examples. The values of (, δ)
accumulate as the algorithm repeatedly accesses the private
data [18].
Theorem 1. [17, Theorem 3.16.] Composition for (, δ)-
differential privacy (the epsilons and the deltas add up): the com-
position of k differentially private mechanisms is (
∑
ii,
∑
iδi)-
differentially private, where for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, the i-th mechanism
is (i, δi)-differentially private.
2.5 Blockchain Technology
Blockchain was first proposed as a proof-of-work consensus
protocol implementation of peer-to-peer timestamp server on
a decentralised basis in the Bitcoin crypto-currency [19]. As a
new form of a distributed database, it can store arbitrary data
in the transaction metadata. Specifically, an electronic coin
(e.g., Bitcoin) is defined as a chain of transactions. A block
contains multiple transactions to be verified, and the blocks
are chained as blockchain using hash functions to achieve
the timestamp feature. Such Blockchain-based distributed
database is known as Blockchain 2.0, including technologies
such as smart properties (the properties with blockchain-
controlled ownership) and smart contracts (programs that
manage smart properties) [20]. In the context of a distributed
database, smart properties are data entries, and smart
contracts are stored procedures. Therefore, our FDPDDL can
be implemented using Blockchain 2.0 technologies, where
the transaction metadata is utilised to disseminate local
DPGAN samples or model gradients among parties, all the
upload and download transactions are recorded immutably
on the blockchain, and algorithms like tokens/credibility
assignments are done using smart contracts, which make all
the transactions among all parties fully visible. Compared
with current server-based frameworks, the peer-to-peer
architecture of Blockchain allows each party to remain
modular while interoperating with other parties. In addition,
instead of ceding control to the central server, Blockchain
enhances security by avoiding single-point-of-failure, each
party in the Blockchain system has control about how its data
should be accessed, hence obeying the institutional policies.
3 FDPDDL FRAMEWORK
This section details our proposed Fair and Differentially
Private Decentralised Deep Learning (FDPDDL) framework,
including the main focuses of FDPDDL, and an investigation
on the Blockchain as the decentralised architecture for
FDPDDL. For the readers’ convenience, Table 2 contains
a list of notations used throughout the paper.
TABLE 2: Table of notations.
Symbol Meaning
Di, Vi,Mi local training data, validation data and standalone
model of party i
pi, di tokens and gradients download budget of party i
cji local credibility of party j given by party i based on
the usefulness of party j to party i
ui number of uploaded DPGAN samples or gradients by
party i
dij number of gradients of party j downloaded by party i
λj sharing level of party j
∆wj gradients of party j
∆(wij)
S selected gradients of party j sent to party i
wi parameter of party i at previous communication round
w′i updated parameter of party i at current round by
combining all parties’ selected gradients
wji
′
temporary parameter of party i by removing party j’s
gradients ∆(wij)
S from w′i to update c
j
i
acc validation accuracy of party i
accj validation accuracy of party i by excluding party j’s
∆(wij)
S
n number of participating parties
cth lower bound of the credibility threshold agreed by the
majority party
C credible party set with local credibility above cth
mj number of matches between majority labels and party
j’s predicted labels
ei gap between download budget di and current down-
loads
∑
j∈C\id
i
j of party i
rij extra gradients of party j that can be provided to i
Li parties in C that can provide additional gradients to
party i
(sk′i, pk
′
i) party i’s key pair for signing and verification, respec-
tively
fsk fresh symmetric encryption key used in the hybrid
cryptosystem
(ski, pki) party i’s key pair for decryption and encryption used
in the hybrid cryptosystem
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3.1 Main focuses of FDPDDL
Privacy: In FDPDDL, we assume parties do not trust each
other or any third server. To remove the deterrents for parties
to collaborate, instead of publishing all the original data or
model parameters, each party leverages DPGAN to publish
differentially private samples for mutual evaluation during
the initialisation stage, and publishes differentially private
gradients during the update stage.
Fairness: The basic idea of fairness is motivated by the
fact that the party who contributes more to other parties
should be given a higher local credibility and rewarded with
a better performing final model than a low-contribution
party. To ensure fairness, we build a reputation system
through digital tokens and local credibility. Each party in
the system participates in the evaluation of the usefulness of
other parties, and requests more samples or gradients from
parties with higher local credibility. In this way, participants
are motivated to release more in order to earn more tokens,
which can be used to download gradients from other parties.
For example, if a local model has 100K parameters, the
participant with sharing level λj of 0.1 can at most publish
10%, i.e., 10K gradients in a privacy-preserving manner and
be rewarded 10K tokens. If any of the other participants
want to download gradients, they need to pay some tokens.
Uploading more samples or gradients gives a participant
more tokens and using these tokens this participant can
download more gradients published by others. This is the
incentive for publishing more, as long as it is within the limits
of privacy. Similarly, downloading more gradients consumes
more tokens. Fairness is achieved by rewarding each party as
per its relative contribution to other parties during download
and upload processes as follows:
• Download as per local credibility: Since one party
might contribute differently to different parties, the
credibility of one party might be different from the
perspective of different parties, therefore, each party i
should keep a local credibility list by sorting all parties
as per their local credibilities in descending order, which
is known only by party i. The higher the local credibility
of party j in party i’s credibility list, the more likely
party i will download gradients from party j, and more
tokens will be rewarded to party j.
• Upload as per request and sharing level: Once one
party receives download request (demand for the num-
ber of gradients), how many gradients will be uploaded
by the requested party depends on both the download
request and the sharing level λj of the requested party.
By enforcing fairness, our FDPDDL allows parties to (i)
independently converge to different parameters; (ii) critically
avoid overfitting their parameters to a single party’s local
training data. Once multiple local models are collaboratively
trained, each party can independently evaluate its model on
the unseen data, without interacting with other parties.
3.2 Blockchain investigation for FDPDDL
For investigation of Blockchain, we first formulate the notion
of “digital token” as a currency for transaction. Second,
we make use of blockchain to record and supervise data
exchange in a distributed manner that is robust, fair, and
transparent. In particular, the differentially private samples
or gradients will be traded using digital tokens, and recorded
as transactions in the blockchain. Tokens can be consumed
by downloading or be earned by uploading differentially
private samples or gradients. In this way, we guarantee the
fair exchange among participants.
Depending on the application scenario, the blockchain in
FDPDDL can be either a consortium blockchain that requires
permissions to participant in the system, such as Hyperledger
Fabric [21], or a permissionless blockchain which anyone can
join at any time, such as Ethereum [22].
3.2.1 Genesis Block
In our blockchain, the first block, i.e., the genesis block,
initialises the system. The genesis block also records the
verification key pk′i of party i’s signing key sk
′
i. Whenever a
new party joins in the network or the existing party adds new
data during training, initialisation will be restarted and a new
block will be added to the blockchain to update the relevant
data. Meanwhile, based on the Blockchain mechanism, we
do not need to deal with the party departure. When a party
leaves the private blockchain network, other parties just need
to remove it from their local credibility lists.
To initialise a genesis block, we propose Algorithm 1
to initialise local credibility and tokens, where participants
contribute their artificial samples in a privacy-preserving
manner, then mutually evaluate the quality of each other’s
samples, and gain reward in the form of tokens. All the re-
leased samples are authenticated through a digital signature
scheme, where the public key pki of party i is advertised
together with the signed samples. This key will later be
included in the genesis block, and the corresponding signing
key sk′i will be used to claim the associated reward. The
agreed reward, in the form of tokens of each party, together
with their verification key pk′i, will be recorded in the genesis
block through an initial blockchain consensus process, which
is specific to each blockchain.
3.2.2 Operation Block
After initialisation, the event of trading (i.e., purchasing)
differentially private gradients are recorded as transactions
in the blocks. To order gradients from a party j, party i
needs to create a purchase order, as a transaction, and record
it in a block. The transaction includes the tokens party i
is willing to pay for a specified number of gradients, and
party i’s public key pki that will be used later by party j for
encryption purpose. Considering the released gradients are
of high dimensionality, the standard hybrid cryptosystem can
be used to take advantage of the efficiency of the symmetric-
key cryptosystem — a freshly generated symmetric key fsk
is used to encrypt gradients, while pki is used to encrypt
fsk. In this way, we minimize the required computational
cost incurred by asymmetric key based encryption. Once
the order is placed in the blockchain, party j agrees and
completes the order in two steps: (1) party j encrypts the
selected gradients with fsk, and sends both the encrypted
gradients and encrypted fsk to a public accessible storage;
(2) party j creates a transaction that contains the hash value
of the encrypted gradients, together with a pointer to the
transaction containing party i’s request. Once this transaction
is included in the blockchain, the agreed tokens will be
transferred from party i to party j automatically through
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blockchain. Note that if party i wants to maliciously denial
the fact that party j has honestly shared gradients, party
j can reveal the provided gradients to other participants
for verification. Since both pki and the hash value of the
encrypted gradients are recorded in the blockchain, with the
gradients revealed by party j, anyone can verify that whether
party j has provided the requested data to party i, and
party i will be punished through a special transaction in the
blockchain. Similarly, thanks to the transparent blockchain,
if party j is misbehaved, it will be detected and punished in
a similar way.
4 FDPDDL REALIZATION
This section details the two-stage realization in FDPDDL:
local credibility and tokens initialisation and local credibility
and tokens update, as shown in Fig. 2.
4.1 Local credibility and tokens initialisation
Algorithm 1 Local credibility and tokens initialisation
Input: number of participating parties n, C={1,. . . ,n}
Output: local credibility and tokens of all parties
1: Pre-train aprior model: Each party i trains standalone
model Mi based on its local training data.
2: Artificial samples generation: Party i releases ui = λi∗|Di|
artificial samples generated by DPGAN to any party j.
3: Local credibility initialisation: Party j labels the received
artificial samples by its standalone model Mj , then returns
the predicted labels back to party i. Meanwhile, party i also
predicts labels for its own DPGAN samples using Mi. Party i
then applies majority voting to all the predicted labels, and
initialises the local credibility of party j as cji =
mj
ui
, where mj
is the number of matches between majority labels and party
j’s predicted labels, and ui is the number of DPGAN samples
generated by party i.
4: Local credibility normalisation: cji =
c
j
i∑
j∈C\ic
j
i
if cji < cth then
party i reports party j as "non-credible"
end if
5: Credible party set: If majority party report party j as "non-
credible", Blockchain removes party j from the credible party
set C and all parties rerun step 4 again.
6: Tokens initialisation to download gradients: pi = λi ∗
|wi|∗(n− 1).
As stated in Algorithm 1, to initialise local credibility
and tokens, each participant first trains a DPGAN based
on its local training data to generate artificial samples with
differential privacy guarantee. These artificial samples are
generated in a way that does not disclose the true sensitive
image instances, as well as the true distribution of data.
Rather, they only provide a few implicit density estimation
within a tolerable privacy budget used in DPGAN [23]. Each
participant then publishes individually generated samples
with size proportional to individual sharing level without
publishing any labels. After receiving DPGAN samples
from one participant, all the other participants run their
pre-trained standalone models on these received artificial
samples and send the predicted labels back to the sender for
local credibility initialisation. Below, we detail the main tasks
in Algorithm 1: sharing level and digital tokens initialisation,
and local credibility initialisation according to the number of
released artificial samples and relative contribution of each
party.
Sharing level and Tokens Initialisation: Based on the
number of artificial samples ui that party i publishes at the
beginning, sharing level is autonomously determined that it
is comfortable with, which can be quantified as λi = ui/|Di|,
where Di is the local training data of party i. The more
private party would prefer to release less samples, while
the less private party is comfortable with releasing more
samples. Similarly, during the update stage, more private
party would prefer to release less gradients. Tokens of party i
are initialised as pi = λi∗|wi|∗(n−1), where λi is the sharing
level of party i, |wi| is the number of model parameters, and
n is the number of parties. The gained tokens will be used to
download gradients in the update stage.
Local Credibility Initialisation. For local credibility
initialisation, each party compares the majority voting of
all the combined labels with an individual party’s predicted
labels to evaluate the effect of this party. It relies on the
fact that the majority voting of all the combined labels
reflects the outcome of the majority party, while the predicted
labels of party j only reflects the outcome of party j. For
example, in the case of party i initialising local credibilities
for other parties, party i broadcasts its artificial samples
generated by DPGAN to other parties, who label these
samples using their pre-trained standalone models, then
send the corresponding predicted labels back to party i.
Meanwhile, party i also labels its own artificial samples
using its pre-trained standalone model, then combines all
the predicted labels of all parties as a label matrix with total
n columns with each column corresponding to one party’s
predicted labels. From this label matrix, party i can initialise
the local credibility of party j as cji =
mj
ui
, where mj is the
number of matches between the majority labels and party j’s
predicted labels, and ui is the number of DPGAN samples
released by party i. Afterwards, party i normalises cji within
[0,1]. If the majority party report that the local credibility of
one party is lower than the threshold cth, implying a “non-
credible” party, it will be banned from the local credibility
lists of all parties. Here, cth should be agreed by the majority
party.
In addition, Algorithm 1 can automatically take care of
the scenario where an honest participant publishes some
gradients, while all the other honest participants assign
very low credibility. In this case, the data distribution
of the publisher is completely different from that of the
other participants, hence it is still reasonable to reduce the
credibility of the publisher, because other participants are
anyway unlikely to gain much from the updates released by
the publisher.
Differentially Private GAN (DPGAN). During the ini-
tialisation stage, we use Differentially Private Generative Ad-
versarial Network (DPGAN) to generate differentially private
artificial samples to mutually benchmark the local credibil-
ity of each party and generate initial tokens. Each party
individually trains a Differentially Private GAN (DPGAN)
by using GANobfuscator which adds tailored noise to
gradients during the training procedure of GAN [24]. The
main idea lies in the post-processing property of differential
privacy, differentially private discriminator combined with
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Fig. 2: Two-stage Realization of FDPDDL. SD1: DPGAN samples randomly chosen by Party 1 from the pool of local
DPGAN samples generated offline, M1: standalone model of Party 1; (∆w12)
S : selected gradients of Party 2 sent to Party 1
(d12 = min(c
2
1 × d1, λ2 × |∆w2|) gradients are selected from ∆w2 and grouped into set S, where c21 × d1 is the download
request from Party 1), M ′2: local model of Party 2 at current communication round.
the computation of generator will produce differentially
private generator. To counter the stability and scalability
issues of training DPGAN, we apply adaptive pruning,
which significantly improve both training stability and
utility [24]. DPGAN can generate infinite number of samples
for the intended analysis, while rigorously guaranteeing
(, δ)-differential privacy of training data. Without loss of
generality, we exemplify DPGAN in the context of the
improved WGAN framework [25]. As demonstrated by the
most recent work [23], [24], DPGAN is able to synthesize
data with inception scores fairly close to both the real data
and the samples generated by the non-private GANs. As
evidenced by Fig. 3, although the generated artificial samples
are not real training samples, the digits clearly vary either
in shape, colour or surroundings, they can still keep the
general characteristics of the class to ensure utility. Due to
limited data size of each party, we let each party apply data
augmentation to expand local data size to 100 times, which
helps DPGAN to generate more reliable samples within a
moderate privacy budget for local credibility initialisation. In
particular, we augment image datasets with rotation range
of 1 and width shift range and height shift range of 0.01. For
text datasets, we repeat each record for 100 times. Samples
generated by DPGAN with  = 4 and δ = 10−5 for MNIST
and  = 4, δ = 10−6 for SVHN are illustrated in Fig. 3. Each
party individually trains a DPGAN on 60,000 augmented
MNIST examples, and 100,000 augmented SVHN examples
respectively. Note that each party can generate massive
DPGAN samples offline without affecting collaboration.
Fig. 3: Generated samples by DPGAN with  = 4, δ = 10−5
for MNIST and  = 4, δ = 10−6 for SVHN. Each party
trains a DPGAN on 60,000 augmented MNIST examples, and
100,000 augmented SVHN examples respectively.
4.2 Local credibility and tokens update
For local credibility and tokens update, each part i takes 20%
local training data as the validation data and uses leave-one-
out strategy to evaluate the local credibility of party j based
on the usefulness of party j’s gradients in each round of
training process. Specifically, party i evaluates the change
of validation accuracy by removing party j’s gradients
from the updated model parameter w′i that combines all
parties’ gradients, i.e., using the combined gradients with
and without party j’s gradients to evaluate the validation
accuracy of party i, which yield acc and accj respectively, the
difference between acc and accj reflects how party j affects
validation accuracy. Party i computes the local credibility
cji of party j at the current round by passing an "accuracy
factor" x = accacc+accj through a sigmoid function f as in
Eq. (2).
cji = f(x) =
1
1 + exp(−15 ∗ (x− 0.5)) (2)
The incentive can be explicitly explained as follows. As x
stands for the accuracy ratio between the validation accuracy
using the combined gradients of all parties and the validation
accuracy using the combined gradients without party j’s
gradients, hence it can be further expressed as:
x =
acc
acc+ accj
=
acc
2 ∗ acc+ ∆ (3)
where accj = acc+ ∆, ∆ indicates the impact of removing
party j, the more positive the value of ∆, the better the
validation accuracy after removing party j, hence the lower
the contribution of party j. To be more specific, if party j has
no impact, ∆ = 0, x = 0.5, cji = 0.5; if party j contributes
negatively, accj > acc, then ∆ > 0, x < 0.5, c
j
i < 0.5; if
party j contributes positively, accj < acc, then ∆ < 0, x >
0.5, cji > 0.5. Each party i keeps updating its local credibility
list based on the contributions of all the other parties in
each round and integrates their historical local credibilities
by averaging over the local credibility of current round and
previous round. In the follow-up rounds, the number of
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gradients to be downloaded will be dependent on the sharing
level, local credibility and download budget.
For tokens update, one token is consumed/rewarded
for each download/upload of gradients. In the subsequent
rounds, party i is more likely to download gradients from
more credible parties, while download less, even ignore those
published by less credible parties. If the credibility of one
party falls below a threshold cth, it can be even banned from
the local credibility list of party i.
Algorithm 2 Local credibility and tokens update
Input: C, cji , pi, pj , di, λj , ∆wj , wi, Vi
Output: updated parameters w′i, credibility c
j
i
′
and tokens
p′j , p′i
In each round, suppose party i aims to download total di
gradients from all parties in C, while party j ∈ C \ i can at
most upload λj × |∆wj | gradients. Party i updates its local
credibility list, model parameters and tokens based on the
gradients of party j ∈ C \ i as follows:
if di < pi then
for j ∈ C \ i do
dij = min(c
j
i ∗ di, λj ∗ |∆wj |)
p′j = pj + d
i
j , p′i = pi − dij
dij gradients of ∆wj are grouped into set S, which
are selected according to the “largest values" criterion: sort
gradients in ∆wj , and upload dij of them, starting from the
largest.
Parameter update: w′i = wi + ∆wi +
∑
j∈C\i∆(w
i
j)
S ,
wji
′
= w′i −∆(wij)S , where wi is party i’s local parameters
of previous communication round.
acc← (w′i, Vi), accj ← (wji
′
, Vi)
x = acc
acc+accj
cji
′
=
c
j
i+f(x)
2
, where f refers to the sigmoid credibility
mapping function in Eq. (2).
end for
credibility normalisation: cji
′
=
c
j
i
′∑
j∈C\ic
j
i
′
if cji
′
< cth then
party i reports party j as "non-credible"
end if
Credible party set: If majority party report party j as "non-
credible", Blockchain removes party j from credible party set
C and all parties remove party j’s model updates ∆(wij)S
from their updated w′i and rerun credibility normalisation.
end if
The detailed local credibility and tokens update proce-
dure is elaborated in Algorithm 2. Note that for any party
i, the received gradients
∑
j∈C\id
i
j could be different from
the download budget di, as party j at most can provide
λj ∗ |∆wj | gradients, while party i plans to download cji ∗ di
gradients from party j. To fill in the gap between di and∑
j∈C\id
i
j , we design a supplement mechanism which can
be referred to the supplementary material.
Differentially Private SGD (DPSGD): To facilitate
collaborative privacy-preserving deep learning, we use
DPSGD [6], [18] to enable information exchange in a differen-
tially private manner. DPSGD consists of two parts: sanitizer
and moments accountant. Sanitizer performs two operations:
(1) limit the sensitivity of each individual example by
clipping the norm of its gradient; and (2) add noise to
the gradient of a lot (several mini-batches) before updating
network parameters. Moments accountant keeps track of a
bound on the moments of the privacy loss random variable
to compute the spent privacy over the course of training.
Different from DPSGD used for the whole database in the
centralised framework [18], decentralised framework enables
each party to individually train local model, and we are
concerned with the privacy leakage from the local model
before publication in each round. To limit the sensitivity of
updates, we follow the DPSGD algorithm [18] to clip the
gradient of each example such that the L2 norm is bounded
by the chosen gradient norm upper bound. Model training
that satisfies differential privacy with respect to example-
adjacent datasets satisfies the intuitive notion of privacy: the
presence or absence of any specific example in the training
data has an imperceptible impact on the parameters of the
learned model [26]. It follows that an adversary inspecting
the trained model cannot infer whether any specific example
was used in the training, irrespective of what auxiliary
information they may have.
We choose σ =
√
2 ∗ ln(1.25/δ)/ for DPSGD, where  ≤
1, by the standard arguments [17], each step is (, δ)-DP with
respect to each lot. Since each lot is randomly sampled with
replacement, the privacy amplification theorem [27] implies
each step is (O(q), qδ)-DP w.r.t the full database, where q =
L/N is the sample ratio. Compared with strong composition
theorem [28], moments accountant delivers tighter bound
in two ways [18]: it saves a
√
log(1/δ) factor in the  part
and a Tq factor in the δ part. For appropriately chosen
noise scale and clipping threshold, DPSGD is (O(q
√
T , δ))-
differentially private. Here, T is the total number of iterations
over the training data. Because of this tighter bound on
privacy spending, DPSGD can iterate over the training data
sufficient number of times before exhausting a moderate
privacy budget. This explains why DPSGD is able to train
deep models that offer good model utility.
We remark that one attractive consequence of applying
DPGAN and DPSGD is that integrating DP into training
generalizes well [29]. Like normal GAN and normal SGD,
DPGAN and DPSGD need to iterate over the training data
and apply gradient computation multiple times. However,
each access to the training data causes information leakage
of the training data and thus incurs privacy loss from the
overall privacy budget . To apply DPGAN and DPSGD
to the distributed/decentralized settings, we follow recent
work [30], [31], [32], [33] to conduct local gradient computa-
tion and calculate privacy on a per party-basis, where each
party individually applies moments accountant [18] to keep
track of the spent privacy budget. Each party repeats the local
training process until the allocated privacy budget is used
up. In particular, for local training process of DPGAN and
DPSGD over local dataset of each party, we allocate a privacy
budget of (4, 10−5)-DP and (2, 10−5)-DP respectively (with
the exception of SVHN where δ = 10−6). As per composition
property of DP in Theorem 1, it results in a total (6, 2∗10−5)-
DP for MNIST, Adult and Hospital, and (6, 2 ∗ 10−6)-DP for
SVHN for each party.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
5.1 Datasets
MNIST1. This dataset is for handwritten digit recognition,
which consists of 60,000 training examples and 10,000 test
1. http://yann.lecun.com/exdb/mnist/
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examples. Each example is a 32x32 gray-level image, with
digits locating at the center of the image.
SVHN2. This dataset is obtained from Google’s street view
images, containing over 600,000 examples, from which we
use 100,000 for training and 10,000 for testing. Each example
is a 32x32 centered image with RGB channels. SVHN is
more challenging than MNIST as most images are noisy and
contain distractors at the sides. The classification objective
for both MNIST and SVHN is to classify the input image as
one of 10 possible digits within [“0”-“9”].
Adult3. The Adult Census dataset includes 48,843 records
with 14 sensitive attributes, including age, race, education
level, marital status, and occupation, etc. This dataset is
commonly used to predict whether an individual makes over
50K dollars in a year (binary). There are 48,842 records in
total, with 24% (11,687) records over 50K and 76% (37,155)
under 50K. We manually balance the dataset to 11,687 records
over 50K and 11687 records under 50K by random sampling,
resulting in 23,374 records. We allocate 80% records as
training set and 20% as test set.
Hospital. The Diabetic Hospital dataset contains data
on diabetic patients from 130 US hospitals and integrated
delivery networks. We directly derived the dataset from [34]
which balances the training set to 10k positives and 10k
negatives. The record of each patient is represented by
127 features, such as demographic (e.g., gender, race, age),
administrative (e.g., length of stay) and medical (e.g., test
results). The task is to predict whether a patient would be
readmitted to hospital within 30 days (binary).
5.2 SGD Frameworks
To show the effectiveness of our proposed FDPDDL, we
compare with three baselines as outlined in [3]. SGD is
adopted in all frameworks.
Centralised framework assumes all the local training
data are pooled into a trusted server to train a global model
on the combined data using standard SGD.
Standalone framework enables participants to train
standalone models on their local training data without
any collaboration. When training alone, each participant
is susceptible to falling into local optima.
Distributed framework allows participants to train in-
dependently and concurrently, and to choose a fraction of
parameters to upload per round. Distributed framework
using selective SGD (DSSGD) can achieve equivalent or
even higher performance than the centralised framework
because updating a small fraction of parameters acts as
a regularisation technique, which prevents the neural net-
work from "memorizing" training data, hence avoiding
overfitting [3]. Therefore, we also use DSSGD in distributed
framework. As DSSGD with round robin parameter exchange
protocol results in the highest accuracy in [3] and facilitates
fairness calculation, we follow the round robin protocol for
DSSGD, where participants run SSGD sequentially: a party
downloads a fraction of the most up-to-date parameters from
the server, runs local training, and uploads selected gradients;
the next party follows in the fixed order [3]. Gradients
are selected and uploaded according to the “largest values”
2. http://ufldl.stanford.edu/housenumbers/
3. http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml/datasets/Adult
criterion which is consistent throughout the entire learning
process in DSSGD.
5.3 Communication Protocol
Asynchronous protocol may lead to concurrency issues, also
known as the staleness effect [35], which is due to the
speed inconsistency between different parties. For those slow
parties, downloaded parameters may lose usefulness if other
parties perform parameter updates much more frequently.
This staleness effect can slow down convergence or even
destroy learning.
In contrast, synchronous SGD typically works better than
the asynchronous SGD, as demonstrated in [36], synchronous
training achieves around 0.5% to 0.9% higher accuracy, needs
fewer epochs to converge, and scales better. Therefore, we
use synchronous parameter exchange protocol in all our
experiments. However, we observed that both federated
learning [4], [5] and distributed learning with DSSGD [3]
suffer from certain non-convergence and accuracy degrada-
tion problems working with this synchronous protocol. That
partly explains why DSSGD adopts asynchronous, round
robin or random order protocols, rather than synchronous
protocol [3]. We also observed that our FDPDDL framework
is less sensitive to various hyper-parameter settings, e.g., it
does not suffer from non-convergence problem even using the
same hyper-parameter setting as in DSSGD. We hypothesize
that the downloading strategy based on accumulated cred-
ibility contributes to model convergence – a by-product of
our framework.
5.4 Experimental Setup
For implementation on image datasets including MNIST and
SVHN, we use multi-layer perceptron (MLP) and convolutional
neural network (CNN) architectures as in [3]. The detailed
architecture description is deferred to the supplementary
file. For text datasets including Adult and Hospital, we
use MLP with a single hidden layer with 128 units. To
reduce the impact of random initialisation and counter non-
convergence, each party initialises its local model with the
same parameter w0, then runs training on its local data to
update local model parameter wi. This contributes to a fair
and consistent local credibility initialisation. For local model
training, we follow the preliminary study in [18] to choose
the lot size as
√
N , where N is the total number of local
training examples including the augmented examples in our
case, and set the initial learning rate as 0.1 with decay 10−7.
During the training of DPGAN and DPSGD, we dynamically
adjust the clipping bounds to achieve faster convergence and
better utility [24]. To boost fairness and enable local models
to move towards their respective model minima, we let each
party individually train 10 local epochs in advance before
collaborative learning starts. For all the experiments, we
empirically set the local credibility threshold as cth = 1n ∗ 23
via grid search, where n is the number of parties.
For applicability, we mainly investigate three realistic
settings as follows, among which, the first two settings
belong to the balanced partition, while the last setting
belongs to the unbalanced partition. In particular, for the
balanced partition of image datasets, we randomly sample
1% of the entire examples as the local training data for
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each party, i.e., 600 examples for MNIST and 1000 examples
for SVHN; for the balanced partition of text datasets, we
randomly sample 370 examples as the local training data of
each party for Adult dataset, and 400 examples as the local
training data of each party for Hospital dataset.
• Same sharing level λi, same data size |Di|: we set the
sharing level of each party as 0.1, where each party
releases 10% artificial samples during the initialisation
stage, and 10% gradients during the update stage;
• Different sharing level λi, same data size |Di|: we
randomly assign sharing levels from [0.1, 0.5] to each
party, each party releases artificial samples and gradients
as per their individual sharing levels;
• Different data size |Di|, same sharing level λi: the
difference of this setting from the previous two settings
lies in that different parties are allocated with different
number of examples, i.e., imbalanced data size. For
example, for MNIST, we randomly partition a total of
{2400, 9000, 18000, 30000} examples among {4, 15, 30, 50}
parties respectively. Similarly, for SVHN, a total of {4000,
15000, 30000, 50000} examples are randomly partitioned
among {4, 15, 30, 50} parties respectively. The sharing
level of each party is set equally to 0.1.
5.5 Quantification of Fairness
In collaborative learning, collaborative fairness should be
quantified from the view of the whole system. In this work,
we quantify collaborative fairness through the correlation co-
efficient between party contributions (i.e., standalone model
accuracies which characterize the learning capability of
different parties on their own data, and sharing levels, which
characterize the sharing willingness of different parties) and
party rewards (i.e., final model accuracies of different parties).
Specifically, we take party contributions as the X-axis,
which represents the contributions of different parties from
the system view. In particular, in Setting 2, we characterize
different parties’ contributions by their sharing levels and
standalone model accuracies, as the party who is less private
and has local data with better generalization empirically
contributes more. In Setting 1 and Setting 3, we characterize
different parties’ contributions by their standalone model
accuracies, as the party who has local data with better
generalization empirically contributes more. Specifically, in
Setting 3, the party with more local data typically yields
higher standalone model accuracy in IID scenarios. In
summary, the X-axis can be expressed by Eq. 4, where λj
and saccj denote the sharing level and standalone model
accuracy of party j respectively:
x =
{ { λ1∑
λj
, · · · , λn∑
λj
}+ { sacc1∑
saccj
, · · · , saccn∑
saccj
}, Setting 2
{sacc1, · · · , saccn}, Setting 1&3
(4)
Similarly, we take party rewards (i.e., final model accura-
cies of different parties) as the Y-axis, y = {acc1, · · · , accn},
where accj denotes the final model accuracy of party j.
As the Y-axis measures local model performance of
different parties after collaboration, it is expected to be
positively correlated with the X-axis to deliver good fairness.
Hence, we formally quantify collaborative fairness in Eq. 5:
rxy =
∑n
i=1(xi − x¯)(yi − y¯)
(n− 1)sxsy (5)
where x¯ and y¯ are the sample means of x and y, sx and sy
are the corrected standard deviations. The range of fairness
is within [-1,1], with higher values implying good fairness.
Conversely, negative coefficient implies poor fairness.
5.6 Experimental Results
TABLE 3: Fairness test of distributed framework and FD-
PDDL on MNIST, with different party numbers (P-k) and
different settings.
Different λi, same |Di| Different |Di|, same λi
Distributed FDPDDL Distributed FDPDDL
CNN MLP CNN MLP CNN MLP CNN MLP
P4 -0.68 0.30 0.92 0.96 -0.97 0.28 0.95 0.98
P15 0.20 -0.15 0.90 0.92 0.03 -0.07 0.91 0.90
P30 -0.02 0.02 0.87 0.85 0.04 0.13 0.84 0.78
P50 -0.16 -0.05 0.78 0.76 0.14 0.07 0.75 0.71
TABLE 4: Fairness test on SVHN.
Different λi, same |Di| Different |Di|, same λi
Distributed FDPDDL Distributed FDPDDL
CNN MLP CNN MLP CNN MLP CNN MLP
P4 0.27 0.26 0.89 0.85 0.38 0.20 0.98 0.97
P15 0.16 0.19 0.83 0.79 -0.13 0.36 0.90 0.89
P30 -0.14 0.12 0.75 0.69 0.04 -0.27 0.85 0.84
P50 -0.25 -0.37 0.72 0.66 -0.23 0.15 0.77 0.73
TABLE 5: Fairness test on Adult and Hospital.
Different λi, same |Di| Different |Di|, same λi
Distributed FDPDDL Distributed FDPDDL
Adult Hosp Adult Hosp Adult Hosp Adult Hosp
P4 0.13 0.15 0.97 0.94 0.15 0.18 0.99 0.95
P15 0.02 0.07 0.90 0.85 0.07 0.10 0.92 0.88
P30 -0.08 -0.12 0.75 0.71 -0.02 0.03 0.77 0.74
P50 -0.12 -0.21 0.68 0.65 -0.15 -0.18 0.69 0.67
Fairness Test. For collaborative fairness comparison, we
only analyze our FDPDDL and the distributed framework
using DSSGD, neglecting the centralised framework and
standalone framework, because parties do not collaborate
in the standalone framework, and parties cannot get access
to the trained global model in the centralised framework,
the global model is only available in the form of “machine
learning as a service" (MLaaS). Table 3 and Table 4 list the
calculated fairness of the distributed framework and our
FDPDDL on MNIST and SVHN datasets using CNN and
MLP architectures, under settings of different sharing level
and imbalanced data partition. Similarly, Table 5 lists the
fairness results on Adult and Hospital datasets. In particular,
we omit the results for the same sharing level setting, as
fairness is a less concerned problem in this setting. All the
results are averaged over five random trails. As is evidenced
by the high positive correlation coefficient, with all of them
above 0.5, FDPDDL achieves reasonably good fairness, which
confirms the intuition behind fairness: the party who is
less private and has more training data delivers higher
accuracy. In contrast, as evidenced in Table 3, Table 4, and
Table 5, the distributed framework exhibits poor fairness
with significantly lower values than that of FDPDDL in all
cases, with even negative values in some cases, manifesting
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the lack of fairness in the distributed framework. This is
because in the distributed framework, all the participating
parties can derive similarly well local models no matter how
much they contribute.
Learning Accuracy. For accuracy comparison, we imple-
ment FDPDDL using synchronous SGD protocol, and set
the sharing level of each party to 0.1 (λj = 0.1). Similarly,
for distributed framework, we implement DSSGD without
differential privacy using round robin protocol, and set the
upload rate θu to 0.1. It is worth noting that we did not
apply any privacy-preserving techniques to all the other
three baseline frameworks in order to assess the impact
of our FDPDDL on accuracy. For MNIST dataset, Fig. 4
demonstrates that FDPDDL does not sacrifice much model
utility when compared to the distributed or the centralised
framework, meanwhile it delivers better accuracy than the
standalone framework.
Detailed accuracy comparison over varying participating
parties (n = {4, 15, 30, 50}) can be found in Table 6 for
MNIST dataset, Table 7 for SVHN dataset, and Table 8
for Adult and Hospital datasets. As can be observed, the
best test accuracy is reported by either the centralised
framework or distributed framework using DSSGD without
differential privacy, while the worst accuracy is given by the
standalone framework (minimum utility, maximum privacy).
In contrast, we observe that FDPDDL allows all parties to
derive higher accuracies than that given by the standalone
models trained on their local data alone, under all the
investigated scenarios. This confirms the benefits brought to
every party by the collaborative learning in our FDPDDL.
Meanwhile, our FDPDDL also achieves comparable accuracy
to the centralised framework and distributed framework
using DSSGD without differential privacy, substantiating the
competitive effectiveness of our decentralised framework.
Combining the above fairness results in Table 3 Table 4,
and Table 5, and accuracy results in Table 6, Table 7 and
Table 8, we conclude that FDPDDL achieves both fairness and
privacy without severely harming accuracy. This proves that our
FDPDDL is a promising framework for effective, privacy-
preserving and more importantly fair collaborative learning.
Complexity Analysis. Considering complexity, the main
communication cost occurs when each party sends its differ-
entially private samples or the selected differentially private
gradients to the other (n− 1) parties, resulting in (n− 1) ∗L
cost, where n and L are the number of parties and the
average size of the released samples and gradients. It should
be noted that parties do not share all their model updates
with other parties, they selectively share model updates as
per download request and their sharing levels, as explained
in Section 3.1. Therefore, we remark that our FDPDDL
is more relevant to practical applications in horizontally
federated learning (HFL) to businesses (H2B) [37], such as
biomedical or financial institutions where the number of
parties n is not too large, while the collaborative fairness
is a more concerned problem. On the other hand, the main
computation cost occurs at each party who needs to train a
local DPGAN and local model to initialise local credibility
and tokens during the first stage, and conduct local training
and mutual evaluation of local credibility during the second
stage. However, we remark that parties can train their
DPGAN models and generate massive DPGAN samples
offline, as parties are required to share their DPGAN samples
only once during the first stage of initialisation, it does not
affect the second stage of update, as shown in Fig. 2. For the
update stage, all parties can individually update their local
models in parallel. Moreover, using DP instead of encryption-
based technique [38] during the second stage results in less
communication cost.
5.7 Malicious Party Detection
We further demonstrate how our framework can provide
robustness to two specific malicious parties: “free-riders”
and GAN attacker.
Robustness to “free-riders”. In collaborative system,
free-riders may pretend to be contributing by generating fake
information to release to the requester. The main incentives
for free-rider to submit fake information may include: (1)
one party may not have any data to train a local model; (2)
one party is too concerned about data privacy to release any
information that may compromise privacy; (3) one party may
not want to consume any local computation power to train
any model. As demonstrated in Example. 2.1, it is possible
for a free-rider without any data or model to have access to
the same global model. We simulate two possible strategies
that such a free-rider party could exploit to achieve its goals.
Release random labels: During the initialisation stage, the
free-rider can release random labels for the received DPGAN
samples. The initialisation stage allows each participant
to evaluate the data quality of other participants before
collaborative learning starts. If a participant does not have
reasonable amount of training data to produce a decent
model, it will perform poorly in the evaluation of DPGAN
samples sent from other parties, thus other parties would as-
sign low local credibility to this party to ensure fairness. More
specifically, when the publisher receives the random labels
from the free-rider, it will find that these random labels are
not consistent with the majority voting, i.e., mjui  cth, then
the free-rider will be reported as "malicious". If the majority
party report one party as "malicious", then the blockchain will
opt this party out in the future communications. Even though
the free-rider might succeed in initialisation somehow, the
credibility of the free-rider is significantly lower compared
with the other honest parties, and the other parties will
download less gradients from this free-rider.
Release random or carefully crafted gradients: During the up-
date stage, the free-rider may publish meaningless gradients
such as random or carefully crafted gradients to pretend that
it is contributing, but do not wish to be “caught” in cheating
(keep stealthy). However, such meaningless gradients will
further downgrade its local credibilities to all the other
parties during the local credibility and tokens update stage
(as described in Section 4.2). Consequently, the free-rider
will gradually lose its chance to earn more tokens as more
and more parties downgrade its local credibility. The tokens
of the free-rider will drain out faster and eventually be
blocked out from the learning process when its tokens are
used up. This can be automatically done by our reputation
system through digital tokens and local credibility and the
Blockchain protocol itself.
We simulate all the above malicious behaviors of the free-
rider and track the collaboration process among parties. We
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Fig. 4: MLP convergence on MNIST dataset for different frameworks and varying number (n) of parties.
TABLE 6: Maximum accuracy [%] on MNIST under varying party number settings, achieved by Centralised, Distributed
(DSSGD without DP, round robin, θu = 10%), Standalone and FDPDDL (see Section 5.4 for details of the three settings)
frameworks using MLP and CNN architectures. P-k indicates there are k parties participating in the learning process.
Framework MLP CNN
P4 P15 P30 P50 P4 P15 P30 P50
Centralised 91.68 95.17 96.28 96.85 96.58 98.19 98.52 98.58
Distributed 91.67 95.17 96.33 97.35 96.25 98.04 98.63 98.83
Standalone 87.39 88.06 88.64 88.80 93.81 93.46 94.04 94.05
FDPDDL (same λi, same |Di|) 88.44 92.18 93.50 95.33 94.34 96.89 97.62 97.67
FDPDDL (different λi, same |Di|) 89.84 92.82 93.50 95.37 94.62 96.15 97.78 98.05
FDPDDL (different |Di|, same λi) 88.92 91.44 92.69 95.02 94.39 96.46 96.92 97.47
TABLE 7: Maximum accuracy [%] on SVHN under varying party number settings using MLP and CNN architectures.
Framework MLP CNN
P4 P15 P30 P50 P4 P15 P30 P50
Centralised 75.40 83.08 85.77 87.15 90.50 91.88 93.42 95.44
Distributed 78.34 85.49 87.64 89.21 91.78 93.03 95.75 96.19
Standalone 57.85 58.77 57.90 59.18 80.24 80.74 81.29 81.60
FDPDDL (same λi, same |Di|) 67.74 76.55 81.86 84.51 88.07 90.18 90.74 92.83
FDPDDL (different λi, same |Di|) 68.16 76.67 79.25 83.57 88.91 90.15 91.29 93.18
FDPDDL (different |Di|, same λi) 68.57 74.15 80.37 83.34 89.53 90.03 92.13 93.82
TABLE 8: Maximum accuracy [%] on Adult and Hospital under varying party number settings using MLP.
Framework Adult Hospital
P4 P15 P30 P50 P4 P15 P30 P50
Centralised 80.69 81.54 82.75 83.43 65.21 69.12 74.50 76.21
Distributed 80.73 81.89 82.81 83.49 65.58 69.50 74.73 77.12
Standalone 78.49 78.50 78.52 78.54 53.51 53.71 53.89 53.95
FDPDDL (same λi, same |Di|) 79.08 80.05 81.16 82.21 63.21 67.35 72.38 74.55
FDPDDL (different λi, same |Di|) 79.15 80.08 81.20 82.28 63.38 67.42 72.29 74.62
FDPDDL (different |Di|, same λi) 79.21 80.17 81.25 82.39 63.35 67.58 72.41 74.58
notice that in most cases, the free-rider can be detected and
excluded at the initialisation stage, and no free-riders can
survive two stages.
Robustness to GAN Attacker. We next discuss the
robustness of our FDPDDL framework against GAN at-
tacks [13]. As argued in [13], GAN attacks can only succeed
if the class distributions of the adversary and the victim
party are Non-IID. Therefore, following the same setting
as in GAN attack [13] on MNIST dataset, we assume the
victim parties own local data of class {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} and the
adversary has data of class {5, 6, 7, 8, 9}, that is, Non-IID
class distribution between the adversary and victim parties.
We confirmed empirically that our FDPDDL framework can
successfully detect and isolate such kind of adversary. In
particular, the initial local credibility of the adversary should
be rated quite low by most parties during the initialisation
stage, i.e., mjui  cth. Therefore, the GAN adversary can
be detected and excluded mostly at the initialisation stage.
Even though the GAN adversary can somehow survive
the initialisation stage, in the subsequent update stage, the
accumulated local credibility of the adversary is rated even
lower when it iteratively publishes false and meaningless
gradients. Eventually, the GAN adversary can be successfully
detected and isolated by our FDPDDL when it is agreed as
"malicious" through the blockchain consensus.
Recall that for GAN attack, the adversary needs to learn
an extra GAN network during the collaborative learning
process and this requires expensive computation. This in-
evitably results in suspicious longer training time than the
honest parties. Therefore, the response time characteristic
can be further incorporated into our credibility mechanism
to greatly reduce the chance of privacy leakage. If one party
does not respond within a reasonable amount of time, other
parties should anyway assume that this party is down and
discard its submission at the current round. Moreover, even
if we assume that the malicious party somehow manages to
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circumvent the above mechanism, there is only little harm
because the subsequent gradients submitted by the malicious
party will not be rated highly by the honest parties, and its
local credibility will get progressively reduced.
6 DISCUSSION
Attacking Fairness in FDPDDL. Here, we discuss some
possible strategies that can be exploited by a free-rider or
a party with very little data to deceive other parties and
gain unfairly from our FDPDDL. For a free-rider owning
no local data, it can manually label the received DPGAN
examples as its local data and publish the labels to cheat the
initialisation stage and the subsequent update stage. But this
can be extremely expensive and practically unachievable for
more complex collaborative learning tasks.
Similarly, for a malicious party having very little local
data, it can make use of the received DPGAN examples to
first train a good representation extractor via unsupervised
representation learning (e.g., autoencoder), then build a
good local classification model on top of the representation
extractor using its labelled local data. Implementing this may
improve the local model quality of this party and increase
its credibility, thus seems to increase the risk of privacy
leakage towards this party. However, we remark that the
privacy of honest parties in FDPDDL should not be affected
under such malicious behaviors, as secured by our majority
voting mechanism used in the initialisation stage. That is,
local improvement of a malicious party does not guarantee
its high credibility as long as it conforms with the majority
honest parties, otherwise even decreases its credibility.
In practice, there may also exist honesty challenge
imposed by a group of malicious parties. For instance,
some malicious parties might collude with each other to
downgrade the credibility of an honest party and to block
it out from the learning process. Or they can upgrade
each other’s credibilities. However, as far as honesty is
concerned, FDPDDL can always be able to detect such
malicious behaviors as long as a majority of the participants
are honest.
Collaborative Learning and GANs. We apply data
augmentation to expand local data size to help DPGAN
generate reliable samples for local credibility initialisation,
and facilitate the implementation of DPSGD in collaborative
learning, as larger amount of local data allows for more
iterations in training a DPGAN or a differentially private
local model within a moderate privacy budget. One natural
question is that, if we can generate infinite examples using
GANs, why do we still need collaborative learning? This
is because GANs can only learn the local data distribution,
which means the examples generated by GANs are restricted
to local data distribution, while collaborative learning is
specially designed to break such local restrictions through
benefiting from global collaboration [3]. Note that using
DPGAN and DPSGD in FDPDDL instead of the standard
GAN and SGD not only preserves the training data privacy,
but also preserves the privacy of the augmented data [39].
7 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This work is the first step in bringing fairness and privacy
to democratise and protect AI, hence providing better
incentive for more parties to collaborate. Our proposed
Fair and Differentially Private Decentralised Deep Learning
(FDPDDL) framework demonstrates the following properties:
(1) it inherently solves the single-point-of-failure problem
existing in all server-based frameworks; (2) it achieves high
fairness by creating a reputation system through digital
tokens and local credibility, which considers the relative
contributions of all the parties through two novel algorithms:
local credibility and tokens initialisation, and local credibility
and tokens update; (3) it provides a viable solution to
detect even isolate the "non-credible" party both before
the collaborative learning process starts, and during the
collaborative learning process, in this way, our scheme
provides robustness to the malicious "free-riders" and GAN
attacker; (4) Differentially Private GAN and Differentially
Private SGD are used to guarantee local privacy of each
party. The experimental results on benchmark datasets in
three realistic settings demonstrate that FDPDDL framework
consistently outperforms the standalone framework and
achieves comparable accuracy to the centralised framework
and distributed framework without differential privacy,
confirming the applicability of FDPDDL. We believe our
findings could be inspiring for the follow-up research in the
decentralized learning, especially we initiate a new field of
collaborative fairness in such an environment. For future
work, we would like to consider more advanced model
architectures, different attacks in distributed/decentralised
learning and Non-IID data.
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